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Note 
The Privileged Physician and Medical Malpractice: 
Why a Qualified Expert Testimonial Privilege Should 
Not Apply to Defendant Treating Health Care 
Providers 
KEVIN V. SWEENEY 
In Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, the Connecticut Appellate 
Court recognized a qualified expert testimonial privilege that precludes discovery 
of an unretained expert’s opinion. That decision threatens to eliminate relevant and 
irreplaceable testimony of defendant treating health care providers in medical 
malpractice cases. The Appellate Court set forth a balancing test to determine if a 
party can overcome the qualified privilege as applied to a particular unretained 
expert: (1) whether the expert reasonably should have expected to be called upon 
to provide opinion testimony in subsequent litigation; and (2) whether there exists 
a compelling need for expert opinion testimony in the case.  
This Note analyzes the balancing test set forth in Redding as applied to 
defendant health care providers who participated in the treatment relevant to 
malpractice litigation. First, this Note considers whether the need for defendant 
health care providers’ testimony should overcome the Redding qualified testimonial 
privilege. Second, this Note explores whether the testimonial privilege violates 
Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery as applied to defendant health care 
providers’ deposition testimony. 
Part I begins by discussing the risk of losing the expert opinion testimony of 
defendant treating physicians in medical malpractice litigation, addressing 
Connecticut’s requirements for expert testimony of treating physicians and the 
unique role of defendant health care providers. Part II presents a compelling need 
for defendant health care providers’ expert testimony in medical malpractice 
litigation, balancing the rights of expert witnesses to be free from testifying with the 
needs of courts and litigants for their evidence. Part III concludes by challenging 
the application of a qualified expert testimonial privilege to the discovery stage of 
medical malpractice litigation, considering the practical difficulties imposed by the 
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The Privileged Physician and Medical Malpractice: 
Why a Qualified Expert Testimonial Privilege Should 
Not Apply to Defendant Treating Health Care 
Providers 
KEVIN V. SWEENEY * 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that your mother suddenly falls ill. She begins experiencing 
excruciating chest pain, shortness of breath, and fatigue. A cardiologist 
discovers an abnormal accumulation of fluid and swelling around your 
mother’s heart and diagnoses her with “pericarditis.” You and your mother 
consult with the cardiologist to assess her treatment options. The cardiologist 
informs you and your mother that a conservative treatment of 
anti-inflammatory medications is an option but instead recommends 
immediate surgical intervention. Your mother trusts the cardiologist and 
agrees to go forward with the operation. 
A nurse escorts your mother into the operating room where the 
cardiologist awaits. The cardiologist then begins operating. After hours of 
anticipation, a nurse notifies you that the operation has come to an end. The 
cardiologist soon arrives to provide the tragic news that the surgery was 
unsuccessful and your mother has passed away. 
Heartbroken and angry, you consult with an attorney about the loss of 
your mother. The attorney advises you to file a lawsuit alleging medical 
malpractice against her treating cardiologist. Desperate for answers, you do 
so on behalf of your mother. It is now the discovery stage of litigation—an 
opportunity for your attorney to inquire about your mother’s medical 
treatment and the events leading up to her death. Your attorney promptly 
schedules a deposition with the defendant cardiologist who treated your 
mother. 
During the defendant’s deposition, your attorney ascertains the facts of 
your mother’s treatment—which examinations the cardiologist relied upon, 
the cardiologist’s diagnosis, the procedures the cardiologist employed 
during your mother’s operation, and the result of the operation. But the 
cardiologist limits all deposition testimony to the facts of your mother’s 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2020; Purdue University, B.A. 2016. 
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treatment and claims a privilege from providing medical opinion testimony. 
Your attorney is unable to discover the cardiologist’s medical opinion as to 
why immediate surgical intervention was recommended, the standard of care 
owed to your mother throughout treatment, or the cause of your mother’s 
death. As a result, your attorney must postpone the deposition for the court 
to determine whether the defendant cardiologist’s expert opinion testimony 
should be privileged from discovery and, if so, which particular questions 
would prohibitively call for such testimony. 
The pattern described above is now a common occurrence in 
Connecticut medical malpractice litigation. During the discovery stage of 
litigation, there is generally no issue when litigants compel defendant 
treating health care providers to provide factual testimony as to the relevant 
treatment they provided. However, defendant parties frequently pursue 
protective orders to preclude compelling opinion testimony from these 
treating health care providers. The Connecticut Appellate Court (Appellate 
Court) recently approved this practice by recognizing an evidentiary 
privilege for unretained experts.   
In Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding (Redding), the Appellate 
Court recognized a qualified expert testimonial privilege that precludes 
discovery of an unretained expert’s opinion.1 That decision threatens to 
eliminate the most relevant and irreplaceable testimony in medical 
malpractice cases when applied to defendant treating health care providers. 
The Appellate Court set forth a balancing test to determine if a party can 
overcome the qualified privilege as applied to a particular unretained expert: 
(1) whether the expert reasonably should have expected to be called upon to 
provide opinion testimony in subsequent litigation; and (2) whether there 
exists a compelling need for expert opinion testimony in the case.2  
The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification to address this 
qualified expert testimonial privilege but determined that the Appellate 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.3 As the Connecticut Supreme Court 
did not reach the merits of the decision, the Redding court’s reasoning for 
and inclination toward establishing a qualified expert testimonial privilege 
loom. Consequently, while this issue remains at large in Connecticut courts, 
the occasion for the Connecticut Supreme Court to rethink the merits of this 
evidentiary privilege awaits another day.  
This Note analyzes the balancing test set forth in Redding as applied to 
defendant health care providers who participated in the treatment relevant to 
malpractice litigation. First, this Note considers whether medical 
malpractice plaintiffs present a “compelling need” for the expert testimony 
                                                                                                                     
1 Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 181 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). 
2 Id. at 187–88. 
3 See Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 207 A.3d 493, 495 n.1, 511 n.13 (Conn. 2019) 
(determining that “[b]ecause the writ of error should have been dismissed for lack of a final judgement, 
we do not reach and are not prepared to recognize whether a qualified unretained expert privilege exists”). 
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of defendant health care providers to overcome the Redding qualified 
testimonial privilege. Second, this Note explores whether the Redding 
qualified testimonial privilege violates Connecticut’s liberal rules of 
discovery as applied to defendant health care providers’ deposition 
testimony. 
Part I of this Note begins by discussing the risk of losing the expert 
opinion testimony of defendant treating physicians in medical malpractice 
litigation, addressing Connecticut’s requirements for expert testimony of 
treating physicians and the unique role of defendant health care providers. 
Part II presents a compelling need for defendant health care providers’ 
expert testimony in medical malpractice litigation, balancing the rights of 
expert witnesses to be free from testifying with the needs of courts and 
litigants for their evidence. Part III concludes by challenging the application 
of a qualified expert testimonial privilege to the discovery stage of medical 
malpractice litigation, considering the practical difficulties imposed by the 
Redding privilege and Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery. 
I. RISKING THE LOSS OF REQUIRED AND RELEVANT EXPERT EVIDENCE 
“Medical malpractice occurs when a . . . doctor or other health care 
professional, through a negligent act or omission, causes an injury to a 
patient.”4 The negligence at issue might be the result of errors in diagnosis, 
treatment, aftercare, or health management.5 Litigating these cases is unique 
in that they always involve a particular expert specialty—namely that of the 
defendant treating health care provider—and require plaintiffs to produce 
expert opinion testimony to support their claims of negligence.  
A. Connecticut’s Requirements for Expert Testimony of Treating 
Physicians 
A jury deciding a case involving a particular expert specialty will 
ordinarily require some form of assistance to understand the underlying 
facts. The vehicle for providing such assistance is an expert witness—a 
person who possesses specialized knowledge that is relevant to the subject 
matter of the litigation.6 According to Connecticut’s Code of Evidence, an 
expert witness is an individual who has acquired scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge through “skill, experience, training, [or] 
education” that “will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or 
                                                                                                                     
4 What Is Medical Malpractice?, AM. BOARD PROF. LIABILITY ATTORNEYS, 
https://www.abpla.org/what-is-malpractice (last visited Aug. 10, 2019). 
5 Id. 
6 Daniel W. Shuman, Testimonial Compulsion: The Involuntary Medical Expert Witness, 4 J. 
LEGAL MED. 419, 420 (1983). 
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in determining a fact in issue.”7 Health care providers, such as defendants in 
medical malpractice litigation, fall within the scope of these expert 
qualification standards. 
The jury’s need for expert testimony to understand the underlying facts 
of medical malpractice cases leaves plaintiffs dependent on the testimony of 
health care providers to meet their burden of proof. In the vast majority of 
these cases, “a layman does not and cannot have the requisite knowledge as 
to whether the proper treatment was given, procedure followed, or care 
used.”8 Without the assistance of expert testimony, the jury is therefore 
unable to accurately determine three of the four elements at issue in medical 
malpractice litigation: the treating physician’s duty to the patient, a breach 
of the legal duty, and the cause of the patient’s injury.9  
Given the technical requirements for establishing the elements of this 
claim, courts have imposed a rule in medical malpractice cases that an expert 
health care provider must perform three separate functions. First, to establish 
the treating physician’s duty to the patient, “[t]he expert must tell the jury 
the standard of skill in the community.”10 Second, to establish a breach of 
the physician’s legal duty, the expert must tell the jury “that the defendant’s 
conduct failed to meet this standard.”11 Finally, to establish the cause of the 
patient’s injury, the expert must tell the jury that the defendant’s failure to 
abide by the standard of care “was the proximate cause of the injuries 
sustained.”12 If a medical malpractice plaintiff cannot obtain this supporting 
expert testimony, then that plaintiff cannot succeed in her claim. 
Certain rules apply to medical malpractice litigants in seeking testimony 
from an expert with specialized knowledge. Of significance, Connecticut’s 
Practice Book requires parties to disclose each person qualified to testify as 
an expert witness at trial.13 Connecticut courts have held on several 
occasions that “the disclosure requirements of [Connecticut’s] Practice 
Book . . . apply with equal force to treating physicians as well as to 
independent experts.”14 Even if treating physicians only testify to their care 
                                                                                                                     
7 CONN. CODE EVID. § 7-2 (Westlaw through amendments received through May 1, 2019); see also 
FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (defining an expert witness as one who has “skill, experience, training, or 
education” that “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). 
8 Chubb v. Holmes, 150 A. 516, 518 (Conn. 1930). 
9 See Robert M. Dombroff, Medical Malpractice in Connecticut, 47 CONN. B.J. 40, 46 (1973) 
(stating that “[i]n a medical malpractice action, the successful plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence 
of the doctor-patient relationship, (2) a duty upon the physician to protect the patient from injury, (3) a 
breach of the legal duty owing the patient, and (4) an injury to the patient with a causal relationship 
between the tortious act and the result”). 
10 Id. at 49. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-4(a) (West 2017). 
14 See Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318, 323 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added) (stating 
that “Practice Book [§ 13-4] employs the term expert witness and does not draw a distinction between 
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of the plaintiff, it is well established that litigants must disclose them as 
expert witnesses.15 These disclosure requirements therefore apply to all 
expert health care providers, regardless of whether they are independently 
retained by parties or named as a defendant in medical malpractice litigation. 
Once disclosed as experts, defendant treating health care providers are 
no longer limited to providing factual testimony. Connecticut’s Practice 
Book expressly permits any health care provider who rendered care or 
treatment to a party to offer their expert testimony at trial, including any 
opinion testimony based upon that physician’s care or treatment or to which 
fair notice is given in the disclosed medical records or reports.16 
Furthermore, as this Note later explores more deeply, litigants are entitled to 
broader access to a treating health care provider’s expert opinion testimony 
during discovery proceedings than what is admissible at trial.17 
Collectively, the need for expert opinion testimony, the requirement to 
disclose treating health care providers as expert witnesses, and the express 
authorization for treating health care providers to offer their expert 
testimony at trial prompts medical malpractice plaintiffs to depose defendant 
physicians in an attempt to discover their expert opinion testimony. 
Although plaintiffs in Connecticut medical malpractice litigation have long 
relied upon the expert testimony of defendant treating health care providers 
in meeting their burden of proof,18 these unretained health care providers 
have recently been resisting inquiry into their expert opinion. Upon expert 
disclosure, defendant treating physicians now frequently file protective 
orders, claiming a privilege from providing their expert opinion. Defendants 
may call upon the Redding court’s reasoning in attempt to preclude expert 
witness testimony.  
B. Privileging the Unique Expert Testimony of Defendant Physicians 
Connecticut provides no constitutional or statutory privilege against the 
compulsion of expert testimony.19 In the absence of such, privileges are 
                                                                                                                     
treating and independent experts”); Bank of Bos. Conn. v. Ciarleglio, 604 A.2d 359, 362 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 608 A.2d 685 (Conn. 1992). 
15 Rosenberg v. Castaneda, 662 A.2d 1308, 1310 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). 
16 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-4(b)(2) (West 2017). E.g., Gemme, 626 A.2d at 325 
(discussing plaintiff’s burden “to establish by expert testimony the standard of medical practice regarding 
informed consent and the fact that the defendant breached that standard”); Williams v. Chameides, 603 
A.2d 1211, 1213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992). 
17 See CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012) (stating that evidence may be elicited at 
a discovery deposition even though the information sought will be inadmissible at trial). 
18 Gemme, 626 A.2d at 325; see also Williams, 603 A.2d at 1213 (finding that the “plaintiff may 
rely on the defendant’s testimony to meet [her] burden of producing positive evidence of an expert nature 
from which the jury could reasonably and logically conclude that the defendant was negligent”). 
19 Brief of Plaintiff-In-Error-Appellee David R. Salinas at 12, Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of 
Redding, 207 A.3d 493 (Conn. 2018) (No. 20054). 
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governed by the principles of common law.20 In Redding, the Appellate 
Court for the first time addressed the question of whether an unretained 
expert testimonial privilege exists under Connecticut common law.21 Issuing 
a groundbreaking decision, the Appellate Court held that Connecticut 
recognizes a broad qualified privilege against compelled testimony by 
unretained expert witnesses,22 regardless of whether they are familiar with 
or unrelated to the facts at issue in a case.  
Redding involved an expert appraiser who was neither a party to the 
proceedings nor retained by a party.23 Although unrelated to the dispute, the 
appraiser had earlier appraised the property at issue and provided his opinion 
to banks regarding the value.24 The Redding court granted the unretained 
expert’s motion for protective order, prohibiting discovery of the appraiser’s 
previously formulated opinion.25 The Appellate Court’s message was clear; 
if you want to support your case with expert testimony, you have to pay for 
it rather than compel it, even if the expert in question already has familiarity 
with relevant case-specific facts.26 
Courts have since applied this decision to privilege the opinion 
testimony of defendant treating health care providers.27 The basis for 
preclusion is that medical malpractice plaintiffs, necessarily equipped with 
retained experts of their own,28 are without a compelling need for the 
testimony of defendant treating health care providers and therefore fail the 
                                                                                                                     
20 CONN. CODE EVID. § 5-1 (West 2019). 
21 Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 183 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). 




26 In determining that an unretained expert privilege exists under Connecticut law, the Redding 
court relied primarily on a provision in the Connecticut Practice Book. See id. at 185–86 (identifying a 
similarity between the Connecticut Practice Book and a Wisconsin statute that served as a basis for an 
unretained expert privilege under Wisconsin law). Practice Book § 42-39 provides in relevant part that 
“[a]n expert witness shall not be appointed by the judicial authority unless the expert consents to act.” 
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 42-39 (West 2020). The Appellate Court noted that “if a court cannot 
compel an expert witness to testify, it logically follows that a litigant should not be able to so compel an 
expert . . . [and] implies a privilege to refuse to testify if the expert is called by a litigant.” Redding Life 
Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 185–86 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017) (citing Burnett v. Alt, 589 
N.W.2d 21, 26 (Wis. 1999)). 
27 See Lavoie v. Manoharan, No. CV146027376, 2017 WL 6417834, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 
20, 2017) (citing Redding in a decision to privilege opinion testimony of a defendant treating physician); 
Order 207.10, Vastarelli v. ProHealth Physicians, NNH-CV-16-6060491-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 
2018) (overruling plaintiff’s objection to a protective order privileging opinion testimony of a defendant 
treating physician). 
28 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (Westlaw through 2019 Supplement to the Connecticut 
General Statutes) (requiring medical malpractice plaintiffs to include in their initial filings a certificate 
of good faith written and signed by a retained expert health care provider). 
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second prong of the Redding test.29 As a result of Connecticut’s recognition 
of this privilege, the role of defendant health care providers in medical 
malpractice litigation may be reduced to that of a lay witness.30 Unlike lay 
witnesses, however, defendant health care providers possess specialized 
knowledge and experience pertaining to the facts at issue in the case that 
renders their opinion of particular assistance to the trier of fact.31 By limiting 
the testimony of defendant health care providers to the facts and 
circumstances of their treatment, the Redding privilege would deprive juries 
from the assistance of the defendant’s medical opinion in understanding his 
or her own care of the plaintiff. 
Treating health care providers later named as defendants in medical 
malpractice litigation are unique witnesses by virtue of the doctor-patient 
relationship which they entered into with the plaintiff. These health care 
providers assumed responsibility for the complex process of monitoring, 
diagnosing, and treating the plaintiff’s medical condition.32 This process 
“involves information gathering and clinical reasoning with the goal of 
determining [and resolving] a patient’s health problem.”33 Although the 
Redding privilege would allow defendant health care providers to testify to 
the factual information gathered in treating the plaintiff, it threatens to 
preclude access to the clinical reasoning that the defendant employed in 
diagnosing the plaintiff and establishing a plan of care. In other words, a 
plaintiff in medical malpractice litigation may not inquire into the standard 
of care followed by the defendant health care provider in assessing the 
information gathered during treatment.34 
                                                                                                                     
29 See Lavoie, 2017 WL 6417834, at *3 (finding that the plaintiffs, who disclosed three experts as 
well as the expert who authored the certificate of good faith, will suffer no prejudice in the absence of 
the defendant treating health care provider’s expert testimony). 
30 See Arnone v. Town of Enfield, 831 A.2d 260, 277 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (“A lay witness 
provides facts that are within his personal knowledge without providing his opinion concerning such 
facts.”), cert. denied, 837 A.2d 804 (Conn. 2003). 
31 See id. at 277–78 (“The test for determining whether a witness is an expert is whether the witness 
has any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world, that renders his opinion of 
assistance to the trier of fact.”). 
32 AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OPINIONS ON PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP 
§ 1.2.6, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-patient-physician-
relationships (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). 
33 INST. OF MED., COMM. ON DIAGNOSTIC ERROR IN HEALTH CARE, IMPROVING DIAGNOSIS IN 
HEALTH CARE 32 (Erin P. Balogh et al. eds., 2015) (emphasis added), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/21794/chapter/4#32. 
34 See Lavoie v. Manoharan, No. CV146027376, 2017 WL 6417834, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 
20, 2017) (holding that a defendant treating health care provider “cannot be compelled to provide expert 
opinion testimony regarding the standard of care, but [can] be questioned about the facts and 
circumstances of his treatment of the plaintiffs’ decedent”). 
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The standard of care defines the parameters of the legal duty that a health 
care provider accepts when treating a patient.35 These standards of care are 
recognized by the profession as being acceptable medical treatment by 
reasonably prudent health care professionals under like or similar 
circumstances.36 In order to abide by their legal duty, a health care provider 
must employ clinical reasoning in diagnosing and treating a patient that is in 
accordance with the standard of care.37 At the essence of forming a 
doctor-patient relationship, each patient entrusts their treating health care 
provider with appreciating and honoring this duty. 
Medical malpractice actions are evaluated by the integrity of the 
processes that the defendant treating health care provider observed.38 The 
integrity of these processes, in turn, is adjudicated by the adherence to 
standards of care.39 While plaintiffs in medical malpractice often rely on 
retained expert testimony to render new opinions for the purposes of trial,40 
such as a breach of the defendant’s legal duty and the cause of the patient’s 
injuries, plaintiffs must first establish the applicable standard of care before 
assessing liability for medical malpractice.41 
The standard of care for medical treatment, however, is elusive since it 
may vary among jurisdictions in the United States.42 For example, if a 
particular community does not have facilities for emergency surgery, 
physicians operating in that community cannot be found negligent for failing 
to perform this surgery within the amount of time that might constitute the 
standard in a well-equipped urban hospital.43 As practice guidelines often 
fail to provide sufficient clarity because of age, conflicting 
recommendations, various levels of evidential support, and underutilization 
by practitioners, the standard of care is often determined de novo and is a 
moving target.44 
Without access to defendant treating health care providers’ expert 
testimony, this moving target proves difficult for medical malpractice 
plaintiffs to pin down. As courts are reluctant to allow plaintiffs to rely on 
expert testimony from health care providers within a defendant’s working 
group, independently retained physicians are unlikely to be familiar with the 
                                                                                                                     
35 Brian K. Cooke et al., The Elusive Standard of Care, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 358, 
358 (2017), http://jaapl.org/content/45/3/358. 
36 What Is Medical Malpractice?, supra note 4. 
37 Id. 
38 Cooke et al., supra note 35, at 359. 
39 Id. 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
41 Cooke et al., supra note 35, at 359. 
42 Id. at 363. 
43 Id. at 361. 
44 Id. at 363. 
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resources and capabilities of the facility responsible for the plaintiff’s care.45 
The clinical reasoning of defendant treating physicians is therefore 
indispensable to establish the range of acceptable treatment modalities 
available during the plaintiff’s care. If juries were precluded from 
considering defendant treating health care providers’ clinical reasoning as to 
their interpretation of the medical facts and choice of available treatment 
options, they would not have the technical expertise needed to “distinguish 
malpractice (an adverse event caused by negligent care or ‘bad care’) from 
maloccurrence (an adverse event or ‘bad outcome’).”46 
II. PRESENTING A COMPELLING NEED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
The qualified expert testimonial privilege recognized in Redding leaves 
unresolved the question of when an expert testimonial privilege should apply 
and in what instances it should not. Without further clarification from the 
Connecticut courts, its application to medical malpractice litigation would 
pose complications. 
According to the Appellate Court in Redding, “[t]he appropriate scope 
of an expert privilege requires a balance between the right of expert 
witnesses to be free from testifying against their will and the needs of the 
court and litigants for testimony.”47 In order to determine the proper scope 
of the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege, it is therefore pertinent 
to assess this balance as applied to defendant treating health care providers 
in medical malpractice litigation. 
A. Policy Justifications for Defendant Physicians 
Courts have recognized two general categories of evidentiary privileges 
in common law and delineated the policy considerations justifying their 
recognition. The first category includes interpersonal privileges. These 
privileges exempt from discovery certain communications between 
individuals where there exists an “imperative need for confidence and 
trust.”48 Some examples of the circumstances justifying exemption involve 
attorney-client, spousal, and psychotherapist-patient communications.49 
                                                                                                                     
45 See Hill v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., No. HHDX04CV4034622S, 2008 WL 2802907, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 30, 2008) (precluding the plaintiff from compelling standard of care testimony 
from the defendant health care provider’s colleagues). 
46 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Med. Liab., Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 109 PEDIATRICS 974, 974 (2002) (citations omitted), 
https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/109/5/974#ref-4. 
47 Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 187 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). 
48 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). 
49 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 387 (1981) (stating that the purpose of 
attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and frank communications between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in observance and administration of justice”); see 
also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) (recognizing that psychotherapist-patient privilege serves 
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In these narrow circumstances, courts have found that protecting such 
communications “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the 
need for probative evidence,”50 and is “essential” to the “satisfactory 
maintenance of the [protected] relationship.”51 Furthermore, courts have 
stated that “the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial 
of the privilege is modest.”52 The assumption is that individuals involved in 
these relationships would neither consult with nor divulge this evidentiary 
information to a confidant, but for the assurance of confidentiality furnished 
by a formal evidentiary privilege.53 Accordingly, the excluded evidence 
would not have come into existence without the privilege.54 The limited 
recognition of such narrow privileges is the common law’s reaction to 
societal demands to encourage and safeguard particular communications.  
The second category involves personal privileges. These are privileges 
that preclude litigants from compelling an individual to divulge certain 
information about oneself. Examples of these exceptional circumstances 
include the privilege against self-incrimination,55 the privilege against 
revealing one’s political vote,56 and the privilege for a party to a civil action 
not to testify if called by his opponent.57  
A basis for justifying these personal privileges may be a theory of 
promoting the right to informational privacy and freedom from scrutiny.58 
“The essence of the right to privacy is control over the dissemination of 
information about oneself.”59 However, such instances seem to stand at odds 
with the policies underlying our adversarial system and sacrifice a greater 
evidentiary benefit than interpersonal privileges. Unlike the interpersonal 
privileges, an absence of the protection afforded by personal privileges 
would not chill the evidence sought from coming into existence. 
Furthermore, personal privileges do not encourage socially desirable 
relationships between individuals. This could explain why the privilege 
against self-incrimination is limited to the protection of criminal defendants 
                                                                                                                     
the public interest of “[t]he mental health of our citizenry, . . . [which] is a public good of transcendent 
importance”); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (spousal privilege is based on “the important public interest in 
marital harmony”). 
50 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51. 
51 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of 
Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
52 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. 
53 Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 317. 
54 See id. at 318 (discussing the chilling effect resulting from the lack of protection over confidential 
communications). 
55 State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227, 239–41 (Conn. 1984). 
56 Mansfield v. Scully, 29 A.2d 444, 449 (Conn. 1942). 
57 Banks v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co., 64 A. 14, 14 (Conn. 1906). 
58 Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 325. 
59 Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 651 (1976). 
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and the testimonial privilege for a party to a civil action was eliminated by 
Connecticut statute in 1848.60  
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege falls within the latter 
category of personal privileges. Redding raises questions regarding the 
existence and scope of an “involuntary expert privilege.”61 The Appellate 
Court explained that “the phrase ‘unretained expert privilege’ . . . mean[s] a 
privilege that may be invoked by an expert to prevent the compelled 
disclosure of his or her opinion.”62  
Justifications for this privilege do not seem to fall within the theory of 
informational privacy. Instead, the most compelling basis for this privilege 
law is the right to autonomy.63 The time that experts spend in litigation 
proceedings is time that is not being spent practicing their chosen profession. 
Accordingly, the “physician’s time spent in [legal proceedings] may be less 
valuable to society than the physician’s time spent healing the sick.”64 Courts 
have similarly reasoned: “We do not force lawyers to provide services to 
anyone who walks in the door. We do not force other professionals to 
provide their services absent compelling circumstances. We see no reason 
to treat experts in a court of law any differently.”65 Thus, proponents of the 
Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege suggest that courts should 
afford experts latitude to develop their faculties, stressing the social utility 
of leaving experts uninterrupted in their specialized role.66  
When the expert in question is also a defendant to the litigation, the 
justifications for this privilege dissipate. This is commonly the occurrence 
of treating health care providers in medical malpractice litigation. In these 
instances, the expert witness must spend time in the litigation proceedings—
there exists no right to be exempt from participating.67 Expert factual 
witnesses are subject to the same discovery about their knowledge of events 
as are non-expert witnesses.68 “The law makes no accommodation for expert 
occurrence witnesses even though discovery may be particularly 
inconvenient or may entail larger financial loss to an expert than does the 
                                                                                                                     
60 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-710 (1902); Banks, 64 A. at 14; C. TAIT & E. PRESCOTT, CONNECTICUT 
EVIDENCE § 5.11, at 257 (5th ed. 2014). 
61 Brief of Plaintiff-In-Error-Appellee David R. Salinas at 1, Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of 
Redding, 175 A.3d 1247 (Conn. 2018) (No. 20054). 
62 Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 182 n.3 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). 
63 Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 327. 
64 Shuman, supra note 6, at 428. 
65 In re Imposition of Sanctions Alt v. Cline, 589 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Wis. 1999). 
66 Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 327. 
67 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-178 (Westlaw through 2020 Supplement to the Connecticut 
General Statutes) (noting that a party can only compel his adversary to testify “in the same manner and 
subject to the same rules as other witnesses”). 
68 See id. (noting that a deposition of an “adverse party” must occur “in the same manner and subject 
to the same rules as those pertaining to the taking of other depositions”). 
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same discovery of non-expert occurrence witnesses.”69 Furthermore, any 
particular witness may be subject to great inconvenience or financial 
sacrifice for their time spent in litigation proceedings, “all suffer[ing] the 
same relative loss: a day’s wage.”70 “[Y]et the court has power to subject 
them to discovery for the same reason it can compel testimony, to promote 
the integrity and efficacy of the judicial process of fact-finding.”71 
A second potential rationale for the Redding qualified expert testimonial 
privilege may be that courts should preclude compelling unwilling experts 
based in a theory of unfairness. This theory assumes that “the expert, unlike 
an ordinary eyewitness, has no unique knowledge . . . . [Therefore], the other 
side, at least in theory, can obtain the same information merely by engaging 
[another] expert.”72 This argument rests on the distinction between lay 
witnesses and expert witnesses. While “the function of the lay witness is to 
testify about the facts relevant to events the witness has perceived,”73 “[t]he 
expert’s assistance to the fact finder does not derive from having been at a 
particular location, at a particular time, looking in a particular direction.”74 
Based on this distinction, litigants have argued that lay witnesses are unique 
and irreplaceable and expert witnesses are not.75 
“The appeal of this argument turns on the assumption that witnesses are 
clearly identifiable as lay or expert.”76 The testimony of an expert defendant 
health care provider does depend upon having been at a particular location, 
at a particular time, looking in a particular direction. Arguably, the role of a 
defendant treating health care provider in medical malpractice litigation is 
therefore unique and irreplaceable.77 Furthermore, “[t]he courts assert that 
the question of unfairness to individuals should not be controlling, since the 
inquiry is directed to one who has been a participant in the occurrence and 
withholding relevant testimony by litigants obstructs the administration of 
                                                                                                                     
69 Virginia G. Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 107 n.147 (1984); see also Baker v. Taco Bell Corp., 163 
F.R.D. 348, 350 (D. Colo. 1995) (stating that a treating doctor is an ordinary witness and not entitled to 
be paid an expert’s fee for time spent in his deposition). 
70 Paul D. Carrington & Traci L. Jones, Reluctant Experts, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 59 
(1996). 
71 Maurer, supra note 69, at 107. 
72 Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party’s Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. 
REV. 455, 482–83 (1962); see Shuman, supra note 6, at 430 (stating that “anyone who received similar 
education and training could provide the same assistance”). 
73 Shuman, supra note 6, at 429. 
74 Id. at 430. 
75 See id. at 429 (arguing that “lay witnesses are unique and irreplaceable” because “[o]nly those 
persons who were in the right place at the right time can now tell us of this past event. No additional 
eyewitnesses can be created”). 
76 Id. at 430. 
77 See id. at 431 (“[T]he expert may have perceived some aspect of the events at issue. Thus, the 
expert’s knowledge of the events is unique and not fungible with that of other experts in the field.”). 
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justice.”78 Judicial proceedings rely on accurate knowledge of the past event 
to decide an issue correctly that may have resulted in the loss of life, liberty, 
or property.79 Such knowledge is uniquely held by defendant treating health 
care providers. 
A third justification may support the Redding qualified expert 
testimonial privilege. Courts have suggested that “compelling expert 
testimony would in essence involve a form of involuntary servitude that 
should normally not be inflicted upon a person merely because of his 
professional expertise.”80 In recognition of this argument, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure offer protection to nonparties to litigation against 
subpoena power.81 The Advisory Committee explains that the purpose of 
these protections is the recognition that compelling an unwilling witness to 
provide an expert opinion implicates the individual’s intellectual property 
rights.82 “Arguably the compulsion to testify can be regarded as a ‘taking’ 
of intellectual property.”83 As the Second Circuit stated, discretion in these 
matters should be informed by factors such as “the degree to which the 
expert is being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the 
case . . . [and] the difference between testifying to a previously formed or 
expressed opinion and forming a new one.”84 
This justification for the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege 
evaporates in instances where the expert is also a defendant party and 
participant to the events giving rise to the litigation. In medical malpractice 
litigation, “the [defendant health care provider] is merely being required to 
provide testimony authenticating work already performed and opinions 
already voluntarily rendered.”85 There seems to be no difference in principle 
between compelling experts to produce a document in their possession and 
compelling them to testify to information that lies within their knowledge,86 
regardless of whether such information is factual or opinion in nature. 
Furthermore, courts and commentators have rebutted the takings argument, 
noting that experts have no generally recognized property rights to their own 
knowledge.87 
                                                                                                                     
78 Anderson v. Florence, 181 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Minn. 1970). 
79 Shuman, supra note 6, at 427. 
80 Ondis v. Pion, 497 A.2d 13, 18 (R.I. 1985). 
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B)(ii) (West 2013). 
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s notes to 1937 adoption (West 2013). 
83 Id. 
84 Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 822 (2d Cir. 1976). 
85 Brief of Defendant-In-Error/Appellant Town of Redding at 13–14, Redding Life Care, LLC v. 
Town of Redding, 175 A.3d 1247 (Conn. 2018) (No. 20054). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2203, 
at 137 (1961) (the expert who was asked to testify was not “render[ing] a professional service,” but was 
“asked merely, as other witnesses are, to testify as to what he knows or believes”). 
86 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2193, at 74 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
87 Maurer, supra note 69, at 108; see also Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 821 (“To clothe all such expert 
testimony with privilege solely on the basis that the expert ‘owns’ his knowledge free of any testimonial 
easement would seal off too much evidence important to the just determination of disputes.”). 
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Considering the needs of medical malpractice litigants for the unique 
expert testimony of defendant health care providers, these defendants 
require more compelling policy interests to justify the Redding privilege 
exempting discovery of their expert opinion. 
B. The Needs of Courts and Litigants 
In light of the technical nature of medical malpractice litigation, the 
requirement of expert opinion testimony, and the unique role of defendant 
health care providers, medical malpractice plaintiffs will suffer an undue 
burden in proving their prima facie case when courts apply the Redding 
qualified expert testimonial privilege to defendant treating health care 
providers. 
In the field of medical malpractice litigation, a court will not ordinarily 
permit a plaintiff to have a jury deliberate on the case unless an expert 
provides supporting testimony.88 As the law currently stands, courts are 
likely to protect unwilling health care providers who are strangers to the 
subject treatment being litigated from being compelled to testify.89 In these 
instances, health care providers who provided no treatment to the plaintiff 
in a medical malpractice litigation will have formed no prior opinion as to 
that treatment. Not only would these experts who are strangers to litigation 
be required to become familiar with the relevant facts and formulate new 
opinions, compelling these non-treating health care providers to testify 
would require them to opine on the treatment of other health care providers 
or colleagues—a circumstance that the Connecticut Superior Court 
expressly sought to prevent.90 Due to the courts’ preference against 
compelling testimony of non-treating expert physicians, any concession to 
the interest of defendant health care providers will detriment the plaintiffs’ 
interests in seeking necessary testimony from qualified experts.91 
Testimony from defendant treating health care providers does not raise 
these same concerns. Familiar with the treatment at issue in litigation, 
defendant health care providers can provide their expert opinion without the 
imposition of additional study or preparation. Furthermore, the more 
specialized a particular medical field and the more limited the specialists, a 
                                                                                                                     
88 Shuman, supra note 6, at 421. 
89 Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 820–21, 824 (precluding a litigant from compelling an expert “to express 
an opinion about facts of which [they] ha[ve] no personal knowledge” or cases in which they are an “utter 
stranger[] to the subject matter of the litigation”). 
90 Hill v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., No. HHDX04CV-4034622S, 2008 WL 2802907, at *3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. June 30, 2008) (considering policy reasons such as imposing a “heavy strain on relationships 
in health care facilities when one health care provider is required to make a public assessment under oath 
about another’s professional performance”); Drown v. Markowitz, No. CV054010740, 2006 
WL 2604986, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2006) (prohibiting a litigant from compelling opinion 
testimony from a health care provider as to “anyone except herself”). 
91 Shuman, supra note 6, at 421. 
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litigant’s need for expert testimony becomes ever more compelling. In such 
circumstances, the defendant health care provider may be the only feasible 
option for plaintiffs in proving their medical malpractice claim. 
Nevertheless, the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege presumes to 
exempt their testimony unless courts find an exception. 
Whether the “courts will compel cooperation of an expert, either at trial 
or in pretrial discovery, varies with the relationship of the expert to the 
parties and to the facts of the case.”92 Many of the earliest cases 
distinguished between the ordinary expert witness and occurrence expert 
witnesses, resolving this issue by generally compelling expert testimony of 
occurrence expert witnesses.93 The occurrence expert witness is the expert 
present at some phase of the event at issue.94 The defendant in a medical 
malpractice action who witnessed the events giving rise to the litigation falls 
within this category of experts. 
Plaintiffs in medical malpractice present a compelling need for the 
opinion testimony of defendant treating physicians, as these occurrence 
experts are unique and irreplaceable. Not only do treating health care 
providers possess specialized skill and knowledge that may be helpful to the 
trier of fact, they perceive first-hand the events that are pertinent to litigation. 
These specialized witnesses may be “called upon to fill three possible roles 
during discovery and at trial, namely, those of an adverse party, an 
eyewitness, and an expert witness.”95 The Redding test threatens to sever the 
third role from this list.  
If the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege were to apply to 
defendant treating health care providers, courts would deprive a medical 
malpractice litigant of the clinical reasoning and medical judgment 
employed by defendants in assessing the information gathered during 
treatment. It is impractical to obtain opinions on the same subject by other 
means, as their opinions are uniquely informed by their real-time 
involvement in the events at issue. The needs of the jury and the courts to 
consider the opinions formed contemporaneously with the defendant 
physician’s treatment provide medical malpractice plaintiffs with a 
compelling need to preserve this testimony from being privileged.  
III. VIOLATING CONNECTICUT’S LIBERAL RULES OF DISCOVERY 
The United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, “[f]or more than 
three centuries[,] it has . . . been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the 
                                                                                                                     
92 Maurer, supra note 69, at 81. 
93 Shuman, supra note 6, at 434. E.g., Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 389–90 (1875); Bd. of 
Comm’rs v. Lee, 32 P. 841, 841–42 (Colo. App. 1893). 
94 Shuman, supra note 6, at 434. 
95 Anderson v. Florence, 181 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn. 1970). 
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public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.”96 This maxim, though, is not 
absolute. In exceptional circumstances, courts have also recognized 
evidentiary privileges that excuse certain individuals from giving testimony 
or producing documents. Privileges are established only in instances in 
which “exclusion [of relevant evidence] is thought to further some other 
societal interest more important than accurate judicial factfinding.”97 These 
evidentiary exclusions are “grounded in a substantial individual interest 
which has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the 
public interest in the search for the truth.”98 
Adhering to the preference for admitting relevant evidence, courts are 
reluctant to craft evidentiary privileges. Due to the inhibiting role that 
privileges play in our judicial system’s search for truth, they “are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed.”99 Accordingly, courts examine various 
claims of privileges “start[ing] with the primary assumption that there is a 
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any 
[privileges] which may exist are distinctly exceptional.”100 
There has been significant disagreement by courts as to which 
circumstances give rise to sufficient justifications for excluding evidence 
from judicial factfinding. The United States Supreme Court (U.S. Supreme 
Court) endeavored to resolve the disagreement with the authority Congress 
granted to it under the Rules Enabling Act.101 The U.S. Supreme Court 
considered codifying evidentiary privileges to bring unity and consistency 
to the law.102 Throughout this great debate as to which evidentiary privileges 
are prevalent enough to put into code, a testimonial privilege personal to 
expert witnesses was without mention. 
An Advisory Committee that the Court appointed promulgated thirteen 
proposed rules to determine when courts should recognize evidentiary 
privileges.103 The Advisory Committee drafted rather elaborate rules that 
established precisely what circumstances permitted invocation of a 
                                                                                                                     
96 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 
(1950)). 
97 Shuman, supra note 6, at 428; see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (“Exceptions from the general rule 
disfavoring testimonial privileges may be justified, however, by a ‘public good transcending the normally 
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’” (quoting Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980))). 
98 State v. Andrews, 726 A.2d 104, 110 n.21 (Conn. 1999) (quoting Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331–32). 
99 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974), superseded by statute on other grounds, FED. 
R. EVID. 104(a); PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 330 (2004) (finding 
that the privilege should be construed strictly). 
100 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (citing Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331). 
101 Act of June 19, 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). 
102 Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 636. 
103 Id. at 615, 655 n.255 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 
501 through 513). 
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privilege.104 In response, “[a] storm of controversy arose after the Supreme 
Court promulgated the Proposed Rules, and no other portion of the rules 
encountered more criticism than the article dealing with testimonial 
privileges.”105 The question of how to treat testimonial privileges proved to 
be especially controversial throughout the judicial and legislative branches 
in formulating these new rules of evidence.106 “Rather than permit[ting] the 
proposed rules to become effective automatically, Congress passed a bill 
requiring affirmative congressional approval of the Rules before they could 
take effect.”107 
Since it was clear that no agreement was likely as to the content of 
specific privilege rules proposed by the Court,108 Congress intervened in 
response to the intensified public dissension and widespread hostility.109 
Congress ultimately resolved the issue by eliminating all of the Court’s 
specific rules on privileges and substituting a single rule in their place—Rule 
501.110 Rule 501 provides that privileges shall be governed by the principles 
of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States “in the 
light of reason and experience.”111 Congress’s intervention in adopting this 
Rule has been “understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a 
privilege . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis” by trial 
judges.112   
The enactment of Rule 501 is revealing. First, it displays that “neither 
[the adopted Federal Rules of Evidence] nor the proposed rules on privilege 
. . . contain any suggestion that an expert enjoys either an absolute or a 
qualified privilege against being called by a party against his will.”113 In 
consideration of the societal interests found, through centuries of experience, 
                                                                                                                     
104 Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 637. 
105 Id. at 638. 
106 Id. at 615. 
107 Act of Mar. 30, 1973, An Act to promote the separation of constitutional powers by suspending 
the effectiveness of the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, the amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
transmitted to the Congress by the Chief Justice on February 5, 1973, until approved by Act of Congress, 
Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973); Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 636. 
108 S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6 (1974). 
109 Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 615. 
110 FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment; S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 11 
(1974); A Bill to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings: Hearing on H.R. 5463 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 356–57 (1974) (amendments by the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee to the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
111 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
112 FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment; S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13 
(1974); see also Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 640–41 (“[A] number of influential individuals and 
groups stridently insisted that the concept of codifying federal evidence law itself was a grave mistake; 
they argued that evidentiary issues should be worked out on a case-by-case basis by trial judges.”). 
113 Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 818 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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to outweigh the public interest in the search for the truth, such a privilege 
was not of concern.  
Second, the enactment demonstrates two policy issues that have 
dominated the debate over privileges: (1) the extent to which a testimonial 
privilege substantially protects the liberties of the individual rather than 
simply setting up a roadblock to the factfinding functions of the trial process; 
and (2) the extent to which trial judges should be granted deference in 
determining privileges.114 Ultimately, Congress decided that overarching 
rules governing the privilege of evidence risk a disparate impact on litigants 
and that the ruling on privileges is best left to the informed discretion of trial 
court judges. 
A. Practical Difficulties for Trial Judges 
The practical implications of the Redding qualified expert testimonial 
privilege remove substantial discretion and flexibility from trial court 
judges. No longer are trial court judges to consider the determining factors 
set forth in previous Superior Court cases—whether an expert previously 
formed an opinion and whether the expert is testifying as to events in which 
he or she was previously involved.115 Such factors have traditionally had 
significant influence on the determination of privileges as applied to treating 
health care providers in medical malpractice litigation. Furthermore, the 
privilege set forth in Redding presents trial court judges with the complicated 
task of distinguishing between factual and opinion testimony of medical 
expert witnesses. Given these practical implications of the Redding test, it 
would undoubtedly impose undue burdens on parties in medical malpractice 
litigation.   
As the law currently stands, parties may file protective orders asking the 
court to preclude opposing counsel from compelling opinion testimony from 
disclosed experts.116 These orders may specify the extent of protection 
necessary in the circumstances of that case, tailoring each order to strike a 
proper balance between the needs of litigants and experts. Absent a qualified 
expert testimonial privilege, these means of protecting litigants from undue 
                                                                                                                     
114 Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 646. 
115 See Drown v. Markowitz, No. CV054010740, 2006 WL 2604986, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 
18, 2006) (prohibiting a litigant from compelling opinion testimony from a health care provider as to 
“anyone except herself”). See also Baker v. Mongelluzzo, No. UWYCV126016555S, 2016 WL 9462318, 
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 28, 2016) (holding that the expert “may not be compelled to give . . . opinion 
testimony regarding treatment by other health care providers . . . [but] may be questioned concerning 
opinions he already formulated, as expressed in medical records”); Hill v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., 
No. HHDX04CV-4034622S, 2008 WL 2802907, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 30, 2008) (considering 
policy reasons such as imposing a “heavy strain on relationships in health care facilities when one health 
care provider is required to make a public assessment under oath about another’s professional 
performance”). 
116 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-5 (West 2012). 
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discovery provide judges with the necessary flexibility and discretion to 
fairly administer trials. 
Connecticut’s Practice Book grants courts the authority to issue these 
protective orders  under broad circumstances.117 It provides, in relevant part, 
“for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense.”118 The party that seeks a protective 
order under Connecticut’s Practice Book bears the heavy burden of 
establishing the requisite “good cause.”119 The rules are clear; no court 
orders shall be made unless justice demands a party’s protection. In its 
determination of whether good cause is shown to justify precluding a party’s 
access to information in discovery proceedings, “the court is obligated to 
take a reasoned and logical approach to the relevant contest between the 
parties.”120 The trial court’s discretion to rule on a protective order “applies 
to decisions concerning whether the information is material, privileged, 
substantially more available to the disclosing party, or within the disclosing 
party’s knowledge, possession or power.”121   
Under the Redding test, the trial court could no longer consider these 
traditional factors of “good cause” in determining whether to privilege 
expert opinion testimony. Instead, courts would be required to make this 
determination based on the expectations of the expert witness—a 
consideration difficult to tangibly ascertain.122 Additionally, the party 
moving for a protective order would no longer bear the “heavy burden” of 
precluding discovery of relevant evidence. The qualified expert testimonial 
privilege, as recognized in Redding, presumes the privilege to apply to all 
unretained experts.123 The party seeking disclosure, therefore, would bear 
the burden of establishing “a compelling need” for the expert’s opinion 
testimony. 
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege may also prove 
complicated for judges to effectively apply. In medical malpractice 
litigation, “it is difficult to distinguish between fact and opinion, as is often 
experienced by trial judges endeavoring to adhere to the rule prohibiting 
                                                                                                                     
117 Id. 
118 Id. (emphasis added). 
119 Babcock v. Bridgeport Hosp., 742 A.2d 322, 355 (Conn. 1999); TelAid Indus. v. Tricomm Grp., 
Inc., No. 064006190, 2007 WL 586783, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007). 
120 TelAid Indus., 2007 WL 586783, at *2. 
121 Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503, 508–09 (Conn. 1983) (emphasis added). 
122 See Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 187–88 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017) 
(stating that courts should consider “whether [the expert] reasonably should have expected [to] be called 
upon to provide opinion testimony in subsequent litigation”). 
123 Id. at 187. 
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eliciting expert-opinion testimony from a defendant [treating health care 
provider].”124  
Precluding inquiring into all matters they deem to be of “an expert 
nature”—anything other than the actual care and treatment of the health care 
provider—presents the issue that what one party considers to be expert 
questioning will not be the same as what the other party considers to be 
expert questioning. As there is no credible way to separate the health care 
provider’s actual treatment from his or her specialized background, it is an 
arbitrary distinction to call a health care provider a mere “fact witness” as 
opposed to an “expert witness.”125 “The doctor’s knowledge of the proper 
medical practice and [their] possible awareness of [their] deviation from that 
standard in the particular case are, in a real sense, as much matters of ‘fact’ 
as are the diagnosis and examination [the doctor] made or the treatment upon 
which [the doctor] settled.”126 
Because of this, when courts preclude all questioning of “an expert 
nature” at the deposition of a treating health care provider, lawyers argue 
over the nature of the questions.127 Such confusion over the nature of 
questions creates significant expense and delay, and litigants cannot 
complete depositions until the court issues a decision on the propriety of 
each question.128 Furthermore, “[r]igid application of the fact/opinion 
distinction might result in the exclusion of the physician’s testimony about 
perception cast in opinion terms.”129 
                                                                                                                     
124 Anderson v. Florence, 181 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 1970); see also Shuman, supra note 6, at 
433 (“Although experts may be compelled to testify to their perceptions in factual terms, it is likely that 
in the area of their expertise, their factual perceptions will be interwoven with their opinions.”). 
125 See Herman Edgar Garner, Jr., Opinion and Expert Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 36 LA. 
L. REV. 123, 125 (1975) (“The theoretical distinction between fact and opinion leads to confusion in the 
courts and is criticized severely by scholars.”). 
126 Anderson, 181 N.W.2d at 878. 
127 For a sampling of these debated questions, see Lavoie v. Manoharan, No. CV146027376, 2017 
WL 6417834, at *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2017) (“[D]id the standard of care require that you 
perform an initial general psychiatric evaluation of [the decedent?]”). See also Plaintiffs’ Objection to 
Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order at Exhibit A, Vastarelli v. ProHealth Physicians, NNH-CV-16-
6060491-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 18, 2018) (“[I]f [a Doppler/ultrasound] is negative, does that rule out 
a pulmonary embolism?”; “What are the ways available to you to rule out a pulmonary embolism?”; 
“How would you characterize the findings on the chest x-ray and the lower extremity Doppler?”; “Do 
you have an understanding as to why [a physician] ordered the Doppler?”; “What is a normal O2 
saturation?”; “Would it give you any concern if [the patient] had shortness of breath walking?”). 
128 See Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 207 A.3d 493, 508 (Conn. 2019) (suggesting 
that parties “make a record of the specific questions that seek allegedly privileged information, and then 
request a further ruling from the trial court on particular questions”). 
129 Shuman, supra note 6, at 438–39; see also Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under 
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 
895, 935 (1976) (“An expert’s testimony as to the facts that he observed, moreover will often indicate 
his expert opinions and conclusions.”). 
 
 
2020] THE PRIVILEGED PHYSICIAN 499 
To avoid the substantial difficulty that trial judges will face in 
determining whether the testimony in question is fact or opinion,130 the 
Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege should not apply to treating 
health care providers in the discovery stage of medical malpractice litigation. 
Otherwise, courts may inadvertently preclude discovery of admissible 
evidence to the detriment of litigants in their search for justice. 
B. Connecticut’s Liberal Rules of Discovery 
Connecticut’s rules of discovery allow significantly greater access to 
information than the rules governing the admissibility of evidence at trial.131 
So long as parties have reason to believe that their discovery requests may 
lead to admissible evidence, they are entitled to the discovery of such 
evidence. The Redding test seems to ignore the distinction between the 
discovery of evidence and the admissibility of such evidence at trial. As a 
result, the Redding qualified expert privilege may deprive medical 
malpractice litigants of expert testimony from treating health care providers 
that can help direct the discovery of relevant and admissible evidence.  
The purpose of discovery is to minimize the likelihood and effects of 
unfair surprise at trial and to provide an informational basis for factfinding 
and analysis at trial or for fair settlement of the dispute.132 Connecticut’s 
Practice Book entitles parties to liberal discovery of information. This rule 
informs the courts that “[d]iscovery shall be permitted if the disclosure 
sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action and 
if it can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially 
greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking 
disclosure.”133 This open exchange of information is the fuel that powers the 
adversarial system. Without it, the search for truth and justice would come 
to a grinding halt.  
The qualified testimonial privilege recognized in Redding is not limited 
to the admissibility of an unretained expert’s opinion at trial. Instead, the 
Redding privilege would preclude a medical malpractice litigant from 
pretrial discovery of a treating health care provider’s opinion testimony as 
                                                                                                                     
130 See Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 416 (1952) (“[F]ew rules have caused 
the courts more trouble than their legalistic struggle to determine whether the testimony in question is 
fact or opinion.”). 
131 See Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enters., Inc., 491 A.2d 389, 392 (Conn. 1985); Milliun v. New 
Milford Hosp., 20 A.3d 36, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 80 A.3d 887 (Conn. 2013); CONNECTICUT 
PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012) (stating that evidence may be elicited at a discovery deposition even 
though “the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”). 
132 Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 456–57 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The policy which 
prompted amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) . . . to allow more liberal discovery of potential expert testimony 
was not merely for convenience of the court and the parties, but was intended to make the task of the trier 
of fact more manageable by means of an orderly presentation of complex issues of fact.”). 
133 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012). 
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well. In consideration of the liberal rules of discovery, the medical opinion 
of treating health care providers should be discoverable. Obtaining such 
information would assist a medical malpractice plaintiff in gathering the 
specialized evidence required for a prima facie case and could guide the 
plaintiff’s discovery of such relevant information from non-treating expert 
physicians retained for litigation. Additionally, obtaining equivalent medical 
opinion testimony from a non-treating expert imposes substantial burdens of 
time and expense on a medical malpractice plaintiff. A defendant treating 
health care provider can surely offer such testimony with substantially 
greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by a plaintiff. 
To uphold and protect this system of liberal discovery, Connecticut has 
set forth Rules of Professional Conduct governing the role of lawyers in the 
exchange of information. These rules hold lawyers to a standard of honesty 
and cooperation to promote accurate and open disclosure. “Fair competition 
in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against . . . concealment 
of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in 
discovery procedure, and the like.”134 Without such Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the adversary system would not function fairly nor would it lead 
to just results.   
“[A]lmost all the limits upon advocacy specified in . . . the Rules of 
Professional Conduct are designed to protect the integrity of the justice 
system,”135 such as by regulating the discovery of information. In particular, 
the Rules of Professional Conduct provide that: a lawyer shall not 
“[u]nlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, 
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary 
value.”136 Commentary makes it clear that this rule also concerns obstructive 
tactics in discovery procedure, “such as at a deposition, by which an attorney 
improperly seeks to hamper a party in its effort to obtain evidence.”137 
Lawyers’ attempts to preclude parties from discovery of information create 
inefficiencies, generate expenses associated with obtaining alternative 
evidence, and limit the examination of information that may be critical to 
the case. For these reasons, conduct that interferes with the discovery system 
is per se sanctionable. 
In reference to Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery, the Appellate 
Court refused to identify an absolute testimonial privilege for treating 
physicians.138 The Appellate Court found that “a categorical rule permitting 
                                                                                                                     
134 Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV065015994S, 2009 WL 3285986, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 
10, 2009). 
135 Id. at *8; 2 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 65.6, at 65–11 (3d ed. Supp. 
2007). 
136 CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4(1) (Westlaw through amendments received May 
1, 2019). 
137 Faile, 2009 WL 3285986, at *7. 
138 Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 183 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017); 
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treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition is not in harmony with 
our liberal discovery rules” and “finds no support in our appellate 
jurisprudence or our long history of trial practice.”139 In refusing to adopt an 
absolute expert privilege, the Appellate Court considered the potential abuse 
of this power—namely, allowing litigants to argue that information is 
privileged even if the expert witnesses themselves do not claim protection 
from disclosing their opinion testimony.140 Accordingly, the Appellate Court 
noted that “[e]ven if [the court] were to assume, arguendo, that there was 
such a privilege [of expert witness testimony], it would be personal to the 
witnesses and not within the scope of any party’s rights to assert.”141 The 
Appellate Court’s dictum and the Rules of Professional Conduct emphasize 
this potential abuse by attorneys and ensure that any claim of privilege by 
experts must be made personally and based on their own unwillingness to 
provide opinion testimony. 
Connecticut courts have explained that “[t]he rules of discovery are 
designed to make a ‘trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and more a fair 
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical 
extent.’”142 In pursuit of this goal and in the administration of justice, “courts 
must have the power to discover and compel the disclosure of evidence. 
Otherwise truth can be concealed and justice can be thwarted at the whim of 
anyone who prefers not to divulge what he knows.”143 The question here is: 
to what extent does the power to compel disclosure of evidence allow access 
to a defendant treating health care provider’s expert opinion testimony? 
C. Restricting Discovery in Medical Malpractice Litigation 
While Connecticut rules governing the admissibility of evidence at trial 
permit any health care provider who rendered care or treatment to a party to 
offer their expert testimony,144 Connecticut rules governing the discovery of 
evidence allow for significantly greater access to information.145 These rules 
                                                                                                                     
Milliun v. New Milford Hosp., 20 A.3d 36, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 80 A.3d 887 (Conn. 2013). 
139 See Milliun, 20 A.3d at 51 (holding that nonparty physicians could be compelled to testify as 
expert witnesses regarding the bases for medical opinions they previously formed after treating). 
140 See id. (noting that the court “fail[ed] to see how the defendant has any standing to assert the 
witnesses’ rights”).   
141 Id. 
142 Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 476 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (citing 
United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)). 
143 United States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
144 E.g., Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318, 325 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); see also Williams v. 
Chameides, 603 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (“[The] plaintiff may rely on defendant’s 
testimony to meet its burden of producing positive evidence of an expert nature from which the jury 
could reasonably and logically conclude that the defendant was negligent.”). 
145 See Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enters., Inc., 491 A.2d 389, 392 (Conn. 1985) (noting that “the 
allowable scope of inquiry at a discovery deposition clearly exceeds the boundaries of admissible 
evidence”); Milliun v. New Milford Hosp., 20 A.3d 36, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 80 A.3d 887 
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lie at the heart of Connecticut’s liberal discovery system and stand at odds 
with the Redding court’s qualified expert testimonial privilege. 
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege departs from 
Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery in several respects. First, the 
Redding privilege does not distinguish between the discovery and 
admissibility of expert testimony.146 Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery 
depend upon this distinction to minimize the likelihood and effects of unfair 
surprise at trial and to provide an informational basis for factfinding. By 
precluding discovery of a defendant treating health care provider’s expert 
opinion, medical malpractice plaintiffs would be substantially limited in the 
information they are able to consider in preparing and litigating their claim. 
Second, consistent with the Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding that 
courts should decide whether to grant an expert testimonial privilege on a 
case-by-case basis,147 the Connecticut rules grant trial judges the discretion 
to issue protective orders once litigants disclose treating health care 
providers as experts. In such instances, it is the party seeking the protective 
order that bears the heavy burden of proof. The Redding qualified expert 
testimonial privilege shifts this burden, requiring the party seeking 
disclosure to demonstrate a compelling need and that the witness reasonably 
expected to provide expert testimony in subsequent litigation.148 The burden 
that the Redding test places on litigants seeking disclosure creates, in effect, 
“a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a 
deposition [that] is not in harmony with our liberal discovery rules.”149 
Third, Connecticut’s rules of discovery place the use of protective orders 
and the extent of discovery within the discretion of the trial judge.150 This 
discretion allows trial judges to tailor discovery in a manner that strikes the 
proper balance between a litigant’s need for testimony and a witness’s 
protection from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, and 
expense. Unlike the Redding privilege that excludes all testimony of an 
“expert nature,” Connecticut’s rules of discovery authorize trial judges to 
designate the particular scope and manner of discovery in consideration of 
the facts in dispute.151 
Finally, the policy considerations set forth in Connecticut’s rules of 
discovery underlying the granting of protective orders do not justify 
precluding discovery of defendant treating health care providers’ opinions. 
                                                                                                                     
(Conn. 2013); CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012) (stating that evidence may be elicited 
at a discovery deposition even though “the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”). 
146 Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 183 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). 
147 Town of Thomaston v. Ives, 239 A.2d 515, 518 (Conn. 1968). 
148 Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 181 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). 
149 Milliun, 20 A.3d at 51 (holding that nonparty physicians could be compelled to testify as expert 
witnesses regarding the bases for medical opinions they previously formed after treating). 
150 Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503, 508 (Conn. 1983). 
151 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-5 (West 2012). 
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Treating health care providers possess direct knowledge and familiarity 
regarding their care and treatment of a party. This knowledge includes 
information with respect to the condition of the party at the time they 
rendered such treatment, as well as the party’s prognosis for future 
treatment, all of which is material to the litigation. Furthermore, treating 
health care providers have the luxury of relying on, in addition to their 
education, training, and experience in their specialized fields, their 
examinations of the patient’s medical histories, present condition, and 
response to treatment. The unique position of these treating health care 
providers offers knowledge of parties’ injuries that is superior to any other 
non-treating health care provider. Because of this, they are in the best 
position to testify to the applicable standard of care for the treatment of the 
party, departures from that standard of care, and the causal relationship 
between those departures and the injuries suffered by the party.  
Possessing such personal knowledge and experience, treating health 
care providers may therefore provide expert opinion testimony without the 
imposition of additional study, preparation, undue burden, or expense. As 
the Second Circuit has recognized, states generally “compel[] experts to 
testify to opinions which they are able to give without study of the facts or 
other preparation,” precluding such testimony only when experts are asked 
to “express an opinion about facts of which . . . [they] ha[ve] no personal 
knowledge” or cases in which they are “utter strangers to the subject matter 
of the litigation.”152 In fact, the law is settled that medical malpractice 
plaintiffs may rely on the defendant treating health care provider for 
testimony regarding the standard of care.153 Precluding inquiry into a 
treating health care provider’s opinions would substantially impede the 
evidentiary obligations of a party in proving their claim and would interfere 
with the relevant contest between parties in accessing information.154 Such 
information is not substantially more available to the plaintiffs, for it is 
                                                                                                                     
152 Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820–21, 824 (2d Cir. 1976). See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. 
Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that “though [the court] cannot require [an expert witness] 
to conduct any examinations or experiments to prepare himself for trial, it can require him to state 
whatever opinions he may have previously formed”); see also CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 
(West 2012) (stating that a party may obtain discovery of material information which is “within the 
knowledge, possession or power of the . . . person to whom the discovery is addressed”).   
153 See Williams v. Chameides, 603 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that, “[t]he 
plaintiff may rely on the defendant’s testimony to meet its burden of producing positive evidence of an 
expert nature from which the jury could reasonably and logically conclude that the defendant was 
negligent”); see also Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318, 325 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). 
154 See Order 134.30, Sabetta v. Guilford Family Practice, NNH-CV-15-6058837-S (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Nov.14, 2016) (compelling expert testimony of defendant treating physician under the liberal rules 
of discovery in Practice Book § 13-2); see Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503, 510 (Conn. 
1983) (finding an abuse of the court’s discretion in denying the plaintiff opportunity for discovery of 
information which the “court had already recognized . . . was necessary”). 
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uniquely held within the knowledge, possession, and power of a treating 
health care provider.155  
The Redding privilege presents a substantial departure from 
Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery. Plaintiffs in complex and 
specialized cases such as medical malpractice litigation depend on expert 
testimony to succeed on their claim and have utilized Connecticut’s liberal 
rules of discovery to meet their burden of proof with the expert opinions of 
treating health care providers. The Redding privilege would unduly impede 
medical malpractice plaintiffs in their search for the expert evidence that the 
law requires. In an adversarial system designed to promote the search for 
truth and access to justice, the Redding court’s qualified expert testimonial 
privilege violates Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery as applied to 
treating health care providers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege as applied to 
defendant treating health care providers would impose an undue burden on 
litigants involved in medical malpractice actions. Given the requirement for 
expert testimony in complex cases of medical malpractice and litigants’ 
demand for the unique expert opinion of treating health care providers, a 
compelling need for the expert testimony of defendant treating physicians is 
likely to outweigh an expert party’s need for protection. Furthermore, 
applying this privilege to preclude defendant health care providers from 
offering their opinion testimony during discovery depositions would result 
in practical difficulties imposed on courts and litigants alike, in turn 
violating Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery. Accordingly, if the 
Redding privilege is reestablished in the Connecticut courts, trial judges 
should find exception to the applicability of this qualified expert testimonial 
privilege to defendant treating health care providers. Such an exception 
would be necessary to avoid inaccuracies in judicial factfinding and 
impediments to justice in medical malpractice litigation. 
 
                                                                                                                     
155 See C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Compelling Expert to Testify, 77 A.L.R.2d 1182 § 2 (1961) 
(“An expert may be compelled to testify as to a matter of fact within his knowledge, notwithstanding that 
such knowledge may have been acquired as the result of special study, learning, skill, or experience.”); 
see also Celentano v. Home Ins. Co., No. CV91 03 42 27S, 1992 WL 335759, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Nov. 5, 1992) (compelling expert testimony of a witness who observed the mechanism of plaintiff’s 
injuries as it would be “impracticable for the plaintiff to obtain facts and opinions on that subject by other 
means”). 
